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Is Anyone Held Accountable When the Skies Fire?

Writer: Pranathi Gowda
Pranathi Gowda
Sep 27
12 min read

It sounds almost like something out of science fiction, but it isn’t. In an age of advancing artificial intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, now carry out many of war’s tasks in the sky without anyone needing to be on the ground. They gather intelligence, conduct surveillance, and carry out precision strikes, all without putting a single soldier in harm’s way.[1]

Drone warfare itself isn’t new; it dates back to the nineteenth century, though the term only came into common use in the 1930s.[2] What has changed is the frequency and reach of drone strikes, and a handful of recent incidents have rattled the world. The 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities is one of the starkest examples: a coordinated drone-and-missile strike that cut the kingdom’s oil production in half and wiped out roughly five percent of the world’s crude supply overnight, sending global markets into a panic. That same year, a Houthi drone attack on a military parade in Yemen sent its own message: that the sky is now open to anyone with a motive, and that precision strikes once reserved for major powers are within reach of irregular forces too.[3]

So when something like this happens, who is actually responsible? The head of state who gave the order? The operator who flew the drone? The company that built it? Who decides any of this, and is anyone’s answer binding?

And if a drone itself can’t be held legally responsible, because it isn’t a legal person, what exactly are we talking about when we talk about liability here? To answer that, it helps to separate two different tracks: the responsibility of states, and the responsibility of individuals.

Take the killing of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. As a senior Defense Department official put it during a press briefing at the time, President Trump had directed, and the Pentagon had then carried out, the airstrike that killed the head of Iran’s Quds Force.[4]

Chapters 1 and 2 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) lay out when a state can be held responsible for a wrongful act on the international stage.[5] Article 1 provides that an internationally wrongful act by a state triggers that state’s international responsibility. But here’s the wrinkle: the strike was ordered by President Trump and carried out by a Defense Department led by Mark Esper. So who, exactly, is responsible: Trump, the Department, Esper, or the United States as a whole? Article 4 answers that directly: the conduct of any state organ, whether it exercises legislative, executive, judicial, or other functions, is attributed to the state itself. And even if, for the sake of argument, the drone had instead been flown by someone who wasn’t formally a state actor, Article 8 would still reach the act, since it attributes to the state the conduct of anyone operating under that state’s instructions.

Article 2 sets out when an act counts as internationally wrongful, using two conditions. Once both are satisfied, ARSIWA supplies the rest of the framework for establishing state responsibility:

Attribution + Breach = Internationally Wrongful Act → State Responsibility

Was There a Breach?

Attribution only tells us whose act it was, not whether the act was wrongful. For that, Article 2 requires that the act be both attributable to a state and in breach of one of that state’s international obligations.[6] Article 12 clarifies that a breach occurs whenever a state’s conduct fails to match what the obligation requires.

In the Soleimani case, the relevant obligation comes from Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence.[7] The strike took place at Baghdad airport, on Iraqi soil, without Iraq’s consent, so on its face it looks like a use of force against Iraq.

The United States never denied carrying out the strike; it simply argued that the strike was lawful. In a letter to the Security Council dated January 8, 2020, Washington invoked its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, pointing to prior attacks by Iran and its proxies and the threat of more to come.[8] ARSIWA has room for exactly this kind of argument: Article 21 provides that a lawful act of self-defense precludes wrongfulness.[9]

Not everyone was persuaded. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Agnès Callamard, examined the strike in a 2020 report and concluded that the United States had failed to demonstrate an imminent threat sufficient to justify self-defense, calling the killing arbitrary and unlawful under human rights law.[10] The United States rejected that conclusion. The lesson here is a useful one: even once attribution is settled, the question of breach can be argued over for years.

When the State Says “Yes, We Did It”

Nobody had to work very hard to attribute the Soleimani strike; the American government announced it openly. ARSIWA accounts for this too: Article 11 provides that conduct not otherwise attributable to a state becomes attributable once the state acknowledges and adopts it as its own.[11] The International Court of Justice relied on this same logic in the 1980 Tehran Hostages case, when Iranian leaders publicly endorsed the seizure of the US embassy.[12]

Drones, though, make this kind of open acknowledgment far less common. A drone can be launched from a distance, by a party with every incentive to deny involvement. That is where the harder cases begin.

The Hard Case: Irregular Forces and Hidden Hands

Return to the two incidents mentioned at the outset. In September 2019, the strikes on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities knocked out about 5.7 million barrels of oil a day, roughly half the kingdom’s output and around five percent of global supply. The Houthis claimed responsibility. The United States, followed by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, pointed instead to Iran.[13] Iran denied any involvement. A December 2019 report from the UN Secretary-General found that some of the cruise-missile and drone components used were of Iranian origin, but it stopped short of establishing who had ordered or launched the attack.[14]

That is the problem in its purest form. The Houthis are not an organ of the Iranian state under Article 4, so the question shifts to Article 8, which covers a person or group acting on a state’s instructions, or under its direction or control.[15]

The International Court of Justice has set a demanding standard here. In Nicaragua v. United States (1986), the Court found that Washington was not responsible for everything the Contra rebels did, even though it had funded and trained them; attributing a specific act required proof that the United States had exercised effective control over that particular operation.[16] When the question resurfaced in the Bosnian Genocide case in 2007, the Court considered whether a looser “overall control” test, the one the ICTY had applied in Tadić for a different purpose, should replace it.[17][18] The ICJ said no: for state responsibility, the stricter effective-control test still governs.[19]

Apply that to drones and the gap only widens. Iran may well have supplied weapons, training, or funding, but that alone falls short of effective control over any single strike. A state can arm a group without directing a particular attack, and because drone components are cheap, portable, and hard to trace, that gap is easier to exploit than ever.

Another Door: Helping Is Not the Same as Doing

If attribution proves too difficult, ARSIWA offers another path. Article 16 makes a state responsible if it knowingly aids or assists another state in committing a wrongful act, provided the act would have been wrongful had the assisting state committed it itself.[20] Note the limitation: this covers assistance to another state, not to a rebel group, which makes it a better fit for a case like the war in Ukraine than for Yemen.

Russia has used Iranian-made Shahed drones against Ukrainian cities throughout the war. Iran initially denied supplying them, before its foreign minister acknowledged in November 2022 that Iran had provided a small number of drones to Russia before the invasion began.[21] If a state knowingly hands over weapons for use in a war of aggression, Article 16 is the rule a lawyer would reach for first. Article 41 adds that no state may recognize as lawful, or help maintain, a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory rule of international law.[22]

A Duty About Territory

There is one more principle worth adding. In the 1949 Corfu Channel case, the ICJ held that every state has an obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts that harm the rights of other states.[23] This duty does not depend on attribution at all. A state that allows drone launches from its own soil, and does nothing once it becomes aware, may bear responsibility for its own failure to act, even if it never launched anything itself. It is a quieter rule than the others, but in an era of small drones launched from fields and rooftops, it may end up mattering more than most.

Individuals Are a Different Story

Everything so far has concerned states. But the questions raised at the start of this piece also asked about the person actually flying the drone. Here the law splits into two tracks, and deliberately so. ARSIWA itself says, in Article 58, that none of it affects the individual responsibility under international law of a person acting on a state’s behalf.[24]

Individual responsibility instead comes from international criminal law. Under Article 25 of the Rome Statute, a person is criminally responsible if they commit, order, or otherwise help commit a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction.[25] Article 28 extends responsibility to military commanders who fail to prevent or punish crimes committed by forces under their control. Deliberately targeting civilians, or launching an attack expected to cause civilian harm clearly excessive in relation to any military advantage, are both war crimes under Article 8 of the same statute. These obligations track Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which requires combatants to distinguish between civilians and fighters (Article 48), bans indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks (Article 51), and requires precautions before any attack (Article 57).[26]

For a drone operator, none of this disappears just because they are sitting in a control room thousands of miles from the target. The pilot, the person who signs off on the target, the commander who set the rules of engagement, and the officials who gave the order can each carry their own share of responsibility.

A real case shows how messy this can get in practice. On August 29, 2021, a US drone strike in Kabul killed ten civilians, including seven children, after mistakenly targeting a vehicle believed to be carrying an attacker. The Pentagon later admitted it was a tragic error.[27] No one was found to have acted with criminal intent, and that is really the point: individual criminal responsibility generally requires intent or recklessness, and honest mistakes are treated very differently under the law. The state, however, can still face questions about reparation, because state responsibility for a wrongful act does not require that any one person acted with a guilty mind.

The Soleimani case illustrates another limit. Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute now covers the crime of aggression, including by political and military leaders.[28] But the ICC has jurisdiction only over states that have joined it or accepted its authority, and the United States, Iran, and Iraq all sit outside the Rome Statute. So in practice, a criminal case against anyone involved in ordering or carrying out that strike is extremely difficult to bring.

What About the People Who Make the Drone?

The manufacturer was on our original list of suspects too, and here the honest answer is that ARSIWA simply does not reach companies; it only covers states. But a state can still be held responsible for what it allows its own companies to do. The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty requires states to refuse arms exports where they know the weapons would be used to commit genocide, war crimes, or attacks on civilians.[29] If a state ignores that requirement and licenses the export anyway, it may end up responsible under Article 16 for assisting the wrongful act. Separately, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights hold that companies bear a responsibility to respect human rights, though those principles are not themselves binding law.[30]

And the Drone Itself?

The drone, of course, is just a machine, and so it cannot be a wrongdoer, and that holds true even for systems that select their own targets using software. Under ARSIWA, nothing about that changes the analysis: Article 4 attributes the conduct of state organs to the state, and a state that fights using a machine is still the one doing the fighting. States party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons agreed on exactly this point in 2019, adopting guiding principles stating that human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained, and that accountability cannot be transferred to a machine.[31] As artificial intelligence takes on a larger role, that principle becomes only more important, since it is what stops anyone from being able to say “the system did it.”

Who Decides? Is There a Sovereign?

This is really the question at the heart of the whole piece. The honest answer is no: there is no world sovereign. International law is a system of equals, with no world government, no global police force, and no court that can compel every state to appear before it.

The International Court of Justice can hear a case only if the states involved consent to its jurisdiction.[32] The Security Council can issue binding decisions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but any of the five permanent members can veto them.[33] It is not a coincidence that the states most likely to be involved in drone strikes are often the same ones holding a veto.

What ARSIWA does provide is a shared vocabulary and a working toolkit. An injured state can demand that a wrongful act stop and that reparation be made, through restitution, compensation, or satisfaction.[34] It can take proportionate countermeasures.[35] And when a rule protects the international community as a whole, even states with no direct stake in the matter can invoke responsibility.[36]

Is any of this binding? The ILC’s Articles were never adopted as a treaty; the General Assembly simply took note of them and commended them to governments in Resolution 56/83.[37] But the ICJ has repeatedly treated the core rules as customary international law, binding on every state regardless. In the Bosnian Genocide case, the Court said so explicitly with respect to Articles 4 and 8.[38] So the substance of the framework is binding, even if the machinery available to enforce it remains weak.

Conclusion

Back to where we started. When a drone strike shakes the world, the answer to “who is responsible?” is rarely a single name. A state bears responsibility if the act is attributable to it and breaches one of its obligations. The individuals who planned, ordered, and carried out the strike can be held criminally liable on a separate track entirely. Companies, and the states that license them, can be caught through arms-control rules and the law of aid and assistance. And the machine itself, however sophisticated, is nobody at all.

The real weakness is not in the rules; it is in proof and enforcement. Drones make it easier to strike from a distance, to obscure who is really behind an attack, and to let a proxy take the blame alone. The Soleimani strike, openly claimed by Washington, was still argued over for years. The Aramco attack, never clearly claimed by anyone, may never be fully resolved. Until states agree on how much control is enough, and until there is a real way to make them comply, the sky will stay just as open as those Houthi words suggested.


[1]What Is the Primary Use of Military Drones?, Taifun (last visited Sept. 24, 2026), https://taifun.army/en/what-is-the-primary-use-of-military-drones/.

[2]A History of Drone Warfare, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (last visited Sept. 24, 2026), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/explainers/history-of-drone-warfare.

[3]10 Most Devastating Drone Attacks, WatchMojo (last visited Sept. 24, 2026), https://www.watchmojo.com/articles/10-most-devastating-drone-attacks.

[4]U.S. Dep't of Def., Senior DOD Official Describes Rationale for Attack on Quds Force Commander (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.war.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/2050341/senior-dod-official-describes-rationale-for-attack-on-quds-force-commander/.

[5]Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA]; see also James Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002).

[6]ARSIWA, supra note 5, arts. 2, 12.

[7]U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.

[8]Letter Dated 8 January 2020 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2020/20 (Jan. 8, 2020); see also U.N. Charter art. 51.

[9]ARSIWA, supra note 5, art. 21.

[10]U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/38 (June 15, 2020) (by Agnès Callamard).

[11]ARSIWA, supra note 5, art. 11.

[12]United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).

[13]Joint Statement by the Leaders of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Sept. 23, 2019).

[14]Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), U.N. Doc. S/2019/934 (Dec. 2019).

[15]ARSIWA, supra note 5, art. 8.

[16]Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 109–115 (June 27).

[17]Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 385, 398, 402–407 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide Case].

[18]Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 115–145 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).

[19]Bosnian Genocide Case, supra note 17, ¶¶ 402–407.

[20]ARSIWA, supra note 5, art. 16.

[21]Parisa Hafezi, Iran Confirms It Supplied Drones to Russia, Reuters (Nov. 5, 2022).

[22]ARSIWA, supra note 5, art. 41.

[23]Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).

[24]ARSIWA, supra note 5, art. 58.

[25]Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8, 25, 28, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].

[26]Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts. 48, 51, 57, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

[27]U.S. Dep't of Def., Executive Summary of the Independent Review of the August 29, 2021 Strike in Kabul, Afghanistan (Nov. 2021).

[28]Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 8 bis.

[29]Arms Trade Treaty arts. 6–7, Apr. 2, 2013, 3013 U.N.T.S. 52.

[30]U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011).

[31]Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Rep. of the 2019 Session, annex IV, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2019/3 (2019).

[32]Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.

[33]U.N. Charter art. 27.

[34]ARSIWA, supra note 5, arts. 30–37.

[35]ARSIWA, supra note 5, arts. 49–54.

[36]ARSIWA, supra note 5, art. 48.

[37]G.A. Res. 56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Dec. 12, 2001).

[38]Bosnian Genocide Case, supra note 17, ¶¶ 385, 398.

 
 
 

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